matrix_sdk_crypto/machine/mod.rs
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// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
use std::{
collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap, HashSet},
sync::{Arc, RwLock as StdRwLock},
time::Duration,
};
use itertools::Itertools;
use matrix_sdk_common::{
deserialized_responses::{
AlgorithmInfo, DecryptedRoomEvent, DeviceLinkProblem, EncryptionInfo, UnableToDecryptInfo,
UnableToDecryptReason, UnsignedDecryptionResult, UnsignedEventLocation, VerificationLevel,
VerificationState,
},
BoxFuture,
};
use ruma::{
api::client::{
dehydrated_device::DehydratedDeviceData,
keys::{
claim_keys::v3::Request as KeysClaimRequest,
get_keys::v3::Response as KeysQueryResponse,
upload_keys::v3::{Request as UploadKeysRequest, Response as UploadKeysResponse},
upload_signatures::v3::Request as UploadSignaturesRequest,
},
sync::sync_events::DeviceLists,
},
assign,
events::{
secret::request::SecretName, AnyMessageLikeEvent, AnyMessageLikeEventContent,
AnyToDeviceEvent, MessageLikeEventContent,
},
serde::{JsonObject, Raw},
DeviceId, MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch, OneTimeKeyAlgorithm, OwnedDeviceId, OwnedDeviceKeyId,
OwnedTransactionId, OwnedUserId, RoomId, TransactionId, UInt, UserId,
};
use serde_json::{value::to_raw_value, Value};
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use tracing::{
debug, error,
field::{debug, display},
info, instrument, warn, Span,
};
use vodozemac::{
megolm::{DecryptionError, SessionOrdering},
Curve25519PublicKey, Ed25519Signature,
};
use crate::{
backups::{BackupMachine, MegolmV1BackupKey},
dehydrated_devices::{DehydratedDevices, DehydrationError},
error::{EventError, MegolmError, MegolmResult, OlmError, OlmResult, SetRoomSettingsError},
gossiping::GossipMachine,
identities::{user::UserIdentity, Device, IdentityManager, UserDevices},
olm::{
Account, CrossSigningStatus, EncryptionSettings, IdentityKeys, InboundGroupSession,
KnownSenderData, OlmDecryptionInfo, PrivateCrossSigningIdentity, SenderData,
SenderDataFinder, SessionType, StaticAccountData,
},
requests::{IncomingResponse, OutgoingRequest, UploadSigningKeysRequest},
session_manager::{GroupSessionManager, SessionManager},
store::{
Changes, CryptoStoreWrapper, DeviceChanges, IdentityChanges, IntoCryptoStore, MemoryStore,
PendingChanges, Result as StoreResult, RoomKeyInfo, RoomSettings, SecretImportError, Store,
StoreCache, StoreTransaction,
},
types::{
events::{
olm_v1::{AnyDecryptedOlmEvent, DecryptedRoomKeyEvent},
room::encrypted::{
EncryptedEvent, EncryptedToDeviceEvent, RoomEncryptedEventContent,
RoomEventEncryptionScheme, SupportedEventEncryptionSchemes,
},
room_key::{MegolmV1AesSha2Content, RoomKeyContent},
room_key_withheld::{
MegolmV1AesSha2WithheldContent, RoomKeyWithheldContent, RoomKeyWithheldEvent,
},
ToDeviceEvents,
},
EventEncryptionAlgorithm, Signatures,
},
utilities::timestamp_to_iso8601,
verification::{Verification, VerificationMachine, VerificationRequest},
CrossSigningKeyExport, CryptoStoreError, DecryptionSettings, DeviceData, KeysQueryRequest,
LocalTrust, RoomEventDecryptionResult, SignatureError, ToDeviceRequest, TrustRequirement,
};
/// State machine implementation of the Olm/Megolm encryption protocol used for
/// Matrix end to end encryption.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct OlmMachine {
pub(crate) inner: Arc<OlmMachineInner>,
}
pub struct OlmMachineInner {
/// The unique user id that owns this account.
user_id: OwnedUserId,
/// The unique device ID of the device that holds this account.
device_id: OwnedDeviceId,
/// The private part of our cross signing identity.
/// Used to sign devices and other users, might be missing if some other
/// device bootstrapped cross signing or cross signing isn't bootstrapped at
/// all.
user_identity: Arc<Mutex<PrivateCrossSigningIdentity>>,
/// Store for the encryption keys.
/// Persists all the encryption keys so a client can resume the session
/// without the need to create new keys.
store: Store,
/// A state machine that handles Olm sessions creation.
session_manager: SessionManager,
/// A state machine that keeps track of our outbound group sessions.
pub(crate) group_session_manager: GroupSessionManager,
/// A state machine that is responsible to handle and keep track of SAS
/// verification flows.
verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
/// The state machine that is responsible to handle outgoing and incoming
/// key requests.
pub(crate) key_request_machine: GossipMachine,
/// State machine handling public user identities and devices, keeping track
/// of when a key query needs to be done and handling one.
identity_manager: IdentityManager,
/// A state machine that handles creating room key backups.
backup_machine: BackupMachine,
}
#[cfg(not(tarpaulin_include))]
impl std::fmt::Debug for OlmMachine {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("OlmMachine")
.field("user_id", &self.user_id())
.field("device_id", &self.device_id())
.finish()
}
}
impl OlmMachine {
const CURRENT_GENERATION_STORE_KEY: &'static str = "generation-counter";
const HAS_MIGRATED_VERIFICATION_LATCH: &'static str = "HAS_MIGRATED_VERIFICATION_LATCH";
/// Create a new memory based OlmMachine.
///
/// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and
/// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
///
/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
pub async fn new(user_id: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId) -> Self {
OlmMachine::with_store(user_id, device_id, MemoryStore::new(), None)
.await
.expect("Reading and writing to the memory store always succeeds")
}
pub(crate) async fn rehydrate(
&self,
pickle_key: &[u8; 32],
device_id: &DeviceId,
device_data: Raw<DehydratedDeviceData>,
) -> Result<OlmMachine, DehydrationError> {
let account = Account::rehydrate(pickle_key, self.user_id(), device_id, device_data)?;
let static_account = account.static_data().clone();
let store =
Arc::new(CryptoStoreWrapper::new(self.user_id(), device_id, MemoryStore::new()));
let device = DeviceData::from_account(&account);
store.save_pending_changes(PendingChanges { account: Some(account) }).await?;
store
.save_changes(Changes {
devices: DeviceChanges { new: vec![device], ..Default::default() },
..Default::default()
})
.await?;
let (verification_machine, store, identity_manager) =
Self::new_helper_prelude(store, static_account, self.store().private_identity());
Ok(Self::new_helper(
device_id,
store,
verification_machine,
identity_manager,
self.store().private_identity(),
None,
))
}
fn new_helper_prelude(
store_wrapper: Arc<CryptoStoreWrapper>,
account: StaticAccountData,
user_identity: Arc<Mutex<PrivateCrossSigningIdentity>>,
) -> (VerificationMachine, Store, IdentityManager) {
let verification_machine =
VerificationMachine::new(account.clone(), user_identity.clone(), store_wrapper.clone());
let store = Store::new(account, user_identity, store_wrapper, verification_machine.clone());
let identity_manager = IdentityManager::new(store.clone());
(verification_machine, store, identity_manager)
}
fn new_helper(
device_id: &DeviceId,
store: Store,
verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
identity_manager: IdentityManager,
user_identity: Arc<Mutex<PrivateCrossSigningIdentity>>,
maybe_backup_key: Option<MegolmV1BackupKey>,
) -> Self {
let group_session_manager = GroupSessionManager::new(store.clone());
let users_for_key_claim = Arc::new(StdRwLock::new(BTreeMap::new()));
let key_request_machine = GossipMachine::new(
store.clone(),
identity_manager.clone(),
group_session_manager.session_cache(),
users_for_key_claim.clone(),
);
let session_manager =
SessionManager::new(users_for_key_claim, key_request_machine.clone(), store.clone());
let backup_machine = BackupMachine::new(store.clone(), maybe_backup_key);
let inner = Arc::new(OlmMachineInner {
user_id: store.user_id().to_owned(),
device_id: device_id.to_owned(),
user_identity,
store,
session_manager,
group_session_manager,
verification_machine,
key_request_machine,
identity_manager,
backup_machine,
});
Self { inner }
}
/// Create a new OlmMachine with the given [`CryptoStore`].
///
/// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and
/// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost.
///
/// If the store already contains encryption keys for the given user/device
/// pair those will be re-used. Otherwise new ones will be created and
/// stored.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
///
/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
///
/// * `store` - A `CryptoStore` implementation that will be used to store
/// the encryption keys.
///
/// * `custom_account` - A custom [`vodozemac::olm::Account`] to be used for
/// the identity and one-time keys of this [`OlmMachine`]. If no account
/// is provided, a new default one or one from the store will be used. If
/// an account is provided and one already exists in the store for this
/// [`UserId`]/[`DeviceId`] combination, an error will be raised. This is
/// useful if one wishes to create identity keys before knowing the
/// user/device IDs, e.g., to use the identity key as the device ID.
///
/// [`CryptoStore`]: crate::store::CryptoStore
#[instrument(skip(store, custom_account), fields(ed25519_key, curve25519_key))]
pub async fn with_store(
user_id: &UserId,
device_id: &DeviceId,
store: impl IntoCryptoStore,
custom_account: Option<vodozemac::olm::Account>,
) -> StoreResult<Self> {
let store = store.into_crypto_store();
let static_account = match store.load_account().await? {
Some(account) => {
if user_id != account.user_id()
|| device_id != account.device_id()
|| custom_account.is_some()
{
return Err(CryptoStoreError::MismatchedAccount {
expected: (account.user_id().to_owned(), account.device_id().to_owned()),
got: (user_id.to_owned(), device_id.to_owned()),
});
}
Span::current()
.record("ed25519_key", display(account.identity_keys().ed25519))
.record("curve25519_key", display(account.identity_keys().curve25519));
debug!("Restored an Olm account");
account.static_data().clone()
}
None => {
let account = if let Some(account) = custom_account {
Account::new_helper(account, user_id, device_id)
} else {
Account::with_device_id(user_id, device_id)
};
let static_account = account.static_data().clone();
Span::current()
.record("ed25519_key", display(account.identity_keys().ed25519))
.record("curve25519_key", display(account.identity_keys().curve25519));
let device = DeviceData::from_account(&account);
// We just created this device from our own Olm `Account`. Since we are the
// owners of the private keys of this device we can safely mark
// the device as verified.
device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
let changes = Changes {
devices: DeviceChanges { new: vec![device], ..Default::default() },
..Default::default()
};
store.save_changes(changes).await?;
store.save_pending_changes(PendingChanges { account: Some(account) }).await?;
debug!("Created a new Olm account");
static_account
}
};
let identity = match store.load_identity().await? {
Some(i) => {
let master_key = i
.master_public_key()
.await
.and_then(|m| m.get_first_key().map(|m| m.to_owned()));
debug!(?master_key, "Restored the cross signing identity");
i
}
None => {
debug!("Creating an empty cross signing identity stub");
PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::empty(user_id)
}
};
// FIXME: This is a workaround for `regenerate_olm` clearing the backup
// state. Ideally, backups should not get automatically enabled since
// the `OlmMachine` doesn't get enough info from the homeserver for this
// to work reliably.
let saved_keys = store.load_backup_keys().await?;
let maybe_backup_key = saved_keys.decryption_key.and_then(|k| {
if let Some(version) = saved_keys.backup_version {
let megolm_v1_backup_key = k.megolm_v1_public_key();
megolm_v1_backup_key.set_version(version);
Some(megolm_v1_backup_key)
} else {
None
}
});
let identity = Arc::new(Mutex::new(identity));
let store = Arc::new(CryptoStoreWrapper::new(user_id, device_id, store));
let (verification_machine, store, identity_manager) =
Self::new_helper_prelude(store, static_account, identity.clone());
// FIXME: We might want in the future a more generic high-level data migration
// mechanism (at the store wrapper layer).
Self::migration_post_verified_latch_support(&store, &identity_manager).await?;
Ok(Self::new_helper(
device_id,
store,
verification_machine,
identity_manager,
identity,
maybe_backup_key,
))
}
// The sdk now support verified identity change detection.
// This introduces a new local flag (`verified_latch` on
// `OtherUserIdentityData`). In order to ensure that this flag is up-to-date and
// for the sake of simplicity we force a re-download of tracked users by marking
// them as dirty.
//
// pub(crate) visibility for testing.
pub(crate) async fn migration_post_verified_latch_support(
store: &Store,
identity_manager: &IdentityManager,
) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
let maybe_migrate_for_identity_verified_latch =
store.get_custom_value(Self::HAS_MIGRATED_VERIFICATION_LATCH).await?.is_none();
if maybe_migrate_for_identity_verified_latch {
identity_manager.mark_all_tracked_users_as_dirty(store.cache().await?).await?;
store.set_custom_value(Self::HAS_MIGRATED_VERIFICATION_LATCH, vec![0]).await?
}
Ok(())
}
/// Get the crypto store associated with this `OlmMachine` instance.
pub fn store(&self) -> &Store {
&self.inner.store
}
/// The unique user id that owns this `OlmMachine` instance.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
&self.inner.user_id
}
/// The unique device ID that identifies this `OlmMachine`.
pub fn device_id(&self) -> &DeviceId {
&self.inner.device_id
}
/// The time at which the `Account` backing this `OlmMachine` was created.
///
/// An [`Account`] is created when an `OlmMachine` is first instantiated
/// against a given [`Store`], at which point it creates identity keys etc.
/// This method returns the timestamp, according to the local clock, at
/// which that happened.
pub fn device_creation_time(&self) -> MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch {
self.inner.store.static_account().creation_local_time()
}
/// Get the public parts of our Olm identity keys.
pub fn identity_keys(&self) -> IdentityKeys {
let account = self.inner.store.static_account();
account.identity_keys()
}
/// Get the display name of our own device
pub async fn display_name(&self) -> StoreResult<Option<String>> {
self.store().device_display_name().await
}
/// Get the list of "tracked users".
///
/// See [`update_tracked_users`](#method.update_tracked_users) for more
/// information.
pub async fn tracked_users(&self) -> StoreResult<HashSet<OwnedUserId>> {
let cache = self.store().cache().await?;
Ok(self.inner.identity_manager.key_query_manager.synced(&cache).await?.tracked_users())
}
/// Enable or disable room key requests.
///
/// Room key requests allow the device to request room keys that it might
/// have missed in the original share using `m.room_key_request`
/// events.
///
/// See also [`OlmMachine::set_room_key_forwarding_enabled`] and
/// [`OlmMachine::are_room_key_requests_enabled`].
#[cfg(feature = "automatic-room-key-forwarding")]
pub fn set_room_key_requests_enabled(&self, enable: bool) {
self.inner.key_request_machine.set_room_key_requests_enabled(enable)
}
/// Query whether we should send outgoing `m.room_key_request`s on
/// decryption failure.
///
/// See also [`OlmMachine::set_room_key_requests_enabled`].
pub fn are_room_key_requests_enabled(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.key_request_machine.are_room_key_requests_enabled()
}
/// Enable or disable room key forwarding.
///
/// If room key forwarding is enabled, we will automatically reply to
/// incoming `m.room_key_request` messages from verified devices by
/// forwarding the requested key (if we have it).
///
/// See also [`OlmMachine::set_room_key_requests_enabled`] and
/// [`OlmMachine::is_room_key_forwarding_enabled`].
#[cfg(feature = "automatic-room-key-forwarding")]
pub fn set_room_key_forwarding_enabled(&self, enable: bool) {
self.inner.key_request_machine.set_room_key_forwarding_enabled(enable)
}
/// Is room key forwarding enabled?
///
/// See also [`OlmMachine::set_room_key_forwarding_enabled`].
pub fn is_room_key_forwarding_enabled(&self) -> bool {
self.inner.key_request_machine.is_room_key_forwarding_enabled()
}
/// Get the outgoing requests that need to be sent out.
///
/// This returns a list of [`OutgoingRequest`]. Those requests need to be
/// sent out to the server and the responses need to be passed back to
/// the state machine using [`mark_request_as_sent`].
///
/// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: #method.mark_request_as_sent
pub async fn outgoing_requests(&self) -> StoreResult<Vec<OutgoingRequest>> {
let mut requests = Vec::new();
{
let store_cache = self.inner.store.cache().await?;
let account = store_cache.account().await?;
if let Some(r) = self.keys_for_upload(&account).await.map(|r| OutgoingRequest {
request_id: TransactionId::new(),
request: Arc::new(r.into()),
}) {
requests.push(r);
}
}
for request in self
.inner
.identity_manager
.users_for_key_query()
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|(request_id, r)| OutgoingRequest { request_id, request: Arc::new(r.into()) })
{
requests.push(request);
}
requests.append(&mut self.inner.verification_machine.outgoing_messages());
requests.append(&mut self.inner.key_request_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await?);
Ok(requests)
}
/// Generate an "out-of-band" key query request for the given set of users.
///
/// This can be useful if we need the results from [`get_identity`] or
/// [`get_user_devices`] to be as up-to-date as possible.
///
/// Note that this request won't be awaited by other calls waiting for a
/// user's or device's keys, since this is an out-of-band query.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `users` - list of users whose keys should be queried
///
/// # Returns
///
/// A request to be sent out to the server. Once sent, the response should
/// be passed back to the state machine using [`mark_request_as_sent`].
///
/// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: OlmMachine::mark_request_as_sent
/// [`get_identity`]: OlmMachine::get_identity
/// [`get_user_devices`]: OlmMachine::get_user_devices
pub fn query_keys_for_users<'a>(
&self,
users: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'a UserId>,
) -> (OwnedTransactionId, KeysQueryRequest) {
self.inner.identity_manager.build_key_query_for_users(users)
}
/// Mark the request with the given request id as sent.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `request_id` - The unique id of the request that was sent out. This is
/// needed to couple the response with the now sent out request.
///
/// * `response` - The response that was received from the server after the
/// outgoing request was sent out.
pub async fn mark_request_as_sent<'a>(
&self,
request_id: &TransactionId,
response: impl Into<IncomingResponse<'a>>,
) -> OlmResult<()> {
match response.into() {
IncomingResponse::KeysUpload(response) => {
Box::pin(self.receive_keys_upload_response(response)).await?;
}
IncomingResponse::KeysQuery(response) => {
Box::pin(self.receive_keys_query_response(request_id, response)).await?;
}
IncomingResponse::KeysClaim(response) => {
Box::pin(
self.inner.session_manager.receive_keys_claim_response(request_id, response),
)
.await?;
}
IncomingResponse::ToDevice(_) => {
Box::pin(self.mark_to_device_request_as_sent(request_id)).await?;
}
IncomingResponse::SigningKeysUpload(_) => {
Box::pin(self.receive_cross_signing_upload_response()).await?;
}
IncomingResponse::SignatureUpload(_) => {
self.inner.verification_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id);
}
IncomingResponse::RoomMessage(_) => {
self.inner.verification_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id);
}
IncomingResponse::KeysBackup(_) => {
Box::pin(self.inner.backup_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id)).await?;
}
};
Ok(())
}
/// Mark the cross signing identity as shared.
async fn receive_cross_signing_upload_response(&self) -> StoreResult<()> {
let identity = self.inner.user_identity.lock().await;
identity.mark_as_shared();
let changes = Changes { private_identity: Some(identity.clone()), ..Default::default() };
self.store().save_changes(changes).await
}
/// Create a new cross signing identity and get the upload request to push
/// the new public keys to the server.
///
/// **Warning**: if called with `reset`, this will delete any existing cross
/// signing keys that might exist on the server and thus will reset the
/// trust between all the devices.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// A triple of requests which should be sent out to the server, in the
/// order they appear in the return tuple.
///
/// The first request's response, if present, should be passed back to the
/// state machine using [`mark_request_as_sent`].
///
/// These requests may require user interactive auth.
///
/// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: #method.mark_request_as_sent
pub async fn bootstrap_cross_signing(
&self,
reset: bool,
) -> StoreResult<CrossSigningBootstrapRequests> {
// Don't hold the lock, otherwise we might deadlock in
// `bootstrap_cross_signing()` on `account` if a sync task is already
// running (which locks `account`), or we will deadlock
// in `upload_device_keys()` which locks private identity again.
let identity = self.inner.user_identity.lock().await.clone();
let (upload_signing_keys_req, upload_signatures_req) = if reset || identity.is_empty().await
{
info!("Creating new cross signing identity");
let (identity, upload_signing_keys_req, upload_signatures_req) = {
let cache = self.inner.store.cache().await?;
let account = cache.account().await?;
account.bootstrap_cross_signing().await
};
let public = identity.to_public_identity().await.expect(
"Couldn't create a public version of the identity from a new private identity",
);
*self.inner.user_identity.lock().await = identity.clone();
self.store()
.save_changes(Changes {
identities: IdentityChanges { new: vec![public.into()], ..Default::default() },
private_identity: Some(identity),
..Default::default()
})
.await?;
(upload_signing_keys_req, upload_signatures_req)
} else {
info!("Trying to upload the existing cross signing identity");
let upload_signing_keys_req = identity.as_upload_request().await;
// TODO remove this expect.
let upload_signatures_req = identity
.sign_account(self.inner.store.static_account())
.await
.expect("Can't sign device keys");
(upload_signing_keys_req, upload_signatures_req)
};
// If there are any *device* keys to upload (i.e. the account isn't shared),
// upload them before we upload the signatures, since the signatures may
// reference keys to be uploaded.
let upload_keys_req =
self.upload_device_keys().await?.map(|(_, request)| OutgoingRequest::from(request));
Ok(CrossSigningBootstrapRequests {
upload_signing_keys_req,
upload_keys_req,
upload_signatures_req,
})
}
/// Upload the device keys for this [`OlmMachine`].
///
/// **Warning**: Do not use this method if
/// [`OlmMachine::outgoing_requests()`] is already in use. This method
/// is intended for explicitly uploading the device keys before starting
/// a sync and before using [`OlmMachine::outgoing_requests()`].
///
/// # Returns
///
/// A tuple containing a transaction ID and a request if the device keys
/// need to be uploaded. Otherwise, returns `None`.
pub async fn upload_device_keys(
&self,
) -> StoreResult<Option<(OwnedTransactionId, UploadKeysRequest)>> {
let cache = self.store().cache().await?;
let account = cache.account().await?;
Ok(self.keys_for_upload(&account).await.map(|request| (TransactionId::new(), request)))
}
/// Receive a successful `/keys/upload` response.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `response` - The response of the `/keys/upload` request that the
/// client performed.
async fn receive_keys_upload_response(&self, response: &UploadKeysResponse) -> OlmResult<()> {
self.inner
.store
.with_transaction(|mut tr| async {
let account = tr.account().await?;
account.receive_keys_upload_response(response)?;
Ok((tr, ()))
})
.await
}
/// Get a key claiming request for the user/device pairs that we are
/// missing Olm sessions for.
///
/// Returns None if no key claiming request needs to be sent out.
///
/// Sessions need to be established between devices so group sessions for a
/// room can be shared with them.
///
/// This should be called every time a group session needs to be shared as
/// well as between sync calls. After a sync some devices may request room
/// keys without us having a valid Olm session with them, making it
/// impossible to server the room key request, thus it's necessary to check
/// for missing sessions between sync as well.
///
/// **Note**: Care should be taken that only one such request at a time is
/// in flight, e.g. using a lock.
///
/// The response of a successful key claiming requests needs to be passed to
/// the `OlmMachine` with the [`mark_request_as_sent`].
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// `users` - The list of users that we should check if we lack a session
/// with one of their devices. This can be an empty iterator when calling
/// this method between sync requests.
///
/// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: #method.mark_request_as_sent
#[instrument(skip_all)]
pub async fn get_missing_sessions(
&self,
users: impl Iterator<Item = &UserId>,
) -> StoreResult<Option<(OwnedTransactionId, KeysClaimRequest)>> {
self.inner.session_manager.get_missing_sessions(users).await
}
/// Receive a successful `/keys/query` response.
///
/// Returns a list of newly discovered devices and devices that changed.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `response` - The response of the `/keys/query` request that the client
/// performed.
async fn receive_keys_query_response(
&self,
request_id: &TransactionId,
response: &KeysQueryResponse,
) -> OlmResult<(DeviceChanges, IdentityChanges)> {
self.inner.identity_manager.receive_keys_query_response(request_id, response).await
}
/// Get a request to upload E2EE keys to the server.
///
/// Returns None if no keys need to be uploaded.
///
/// The response of a successful key upload requests needs to be passed to
/// the [`OlmMachine`] with the [`receive_keys_upload_response`].
///
/// [`receive_keys_upload_response`]: #method.receive_keys_upload_response
async fn keys_for_upload(&self, account: &Account) -> Option<UploadKeysRequest> {
let (mut device_keys, one_time_keys, fallback_keys) = account.keys_for_upload();
// When uploading the device keys, if all private cross-signing keys are
// available locally, sign the device using these cross-signing keys.
// This will mark the device as verified if the user identity (i.e., the
// cross-signing keys) is also marked as verified.
//
// This approach eliminates the need to upload signatures in a separate request,
// ensuring that other users/devices will never encounter this device
// without a signature from their user identity. Consequently, they will
// never see the device as unverified.
if let Some(device_keys) = &mut device_keys {
let private_identity = self.store().private_identity();
let guard = private_identity.lock().await;
if guard.status().await.is_complete() {
guard.sign_device_keys(device_keys).await.expect(
"We should be able to sign our device keys since we confirmed that we \
have a complete set of private cross-signing keys",
);
}
}
if device_keys.is_none() && one_time_keys.is_empty() && fallback_keys.is_empty() {
None
} else {
let device_keys = device_keys.map(|d| d.to_raw());
Some(assign!(UploadKeysRequest::new(), {
device_keys, one_time_keys, fallback_keys
}))
}
}
/// Decrypt a to-device event.
///
/// Returns a decrypted `ToDeviceEvent` if the decryption was successful,
/// an error indicating why decryption failed otherwise.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `event` - The to-device event that should be decrypted.
async fn decrypt_to_device_event(
&self,
transaction: &mut StoreTransaction,
event: &EncryptedToDeviceEvent,
changes: &mut Changes,
) -> OlmResult<OlmDecryptionInfo> {
let mut decrypted =
transaction.account().await?.decrypt_to_device_event(&self.inner.store, event).await?;
// Handle the decrypted event, e.g. fetch out Megolm sessions out of
// the event.
self.handle_decrypted_to_device_event(transaction.cache(), &mut decrypted, changes).await?;
Ok(decrypted)
}
#[instrument(
skip_all,
// This function is only ever called by add_room_key via
// handle_decrypted_to_device_event, so sender, sender_key, and algorithm are
// already recorded.
fields(room_id = ? content.room_id, session_id)
)]
async fn handle_key(
&self,
sender_key: Curve25519PublicKey,
event: &DecryptedRoomKeyEvent,
content: &MegolmV1AesSha2Content,
) -> OlmResult<Option<InboundGroupSession>> {
let session = InboundGroupSession::new(
sender_key,
event.keys.ed25519,
&content.room_id,
&content.session_key,
SenderData::unknown(),
event.content.algorithm(),
None,
);
match session {
Ok(mut session) => {
Span::current().record("session_id", session.session_id());
let sender_data =
SenderDataFinder::find_using_event(self.store(), sender_key, event, &session)
.await?;
session.sender_data = sender_data;
match self.store().compare_group_session(&session).await? {
SessionOrdering::Better => {
info!("Received a new megolm room key");
Ok(Some(session))
}
comparison_result => {
warn!(
?comparison_result,
"Received a megolm room key that we already have a better version \
of, discarding"
);
Ok(None)
}
}
}
Err(e) => {
Span::current().record("session_id", &content.session_id);
warn!("Received a room key event which contained an invalid session key: {e}");
Ok(None)
}
}
}
/// Create a group session from a room key and add it to our crypto store.
#[instrument(skip_all, fields(algorithm = ?event.content.algorithm()))]
async fn add_room_key(
&self,
sender_key: Curve25519PublicKey,
event: &DecryptedRoomKeyEvent,
) -> OlmResult<Option<InboundGroupSession>> {
match &event.content {
RoomKeyContent::MegolmV1AesSha2(content) => {
self.handle_key(sender_key, event, content).await
}
#[cfg(feature = "experimental-algorithms")]
RoomKeyContent::MegolmV2AesSha2(content) => {
self.handle_key(sender_key, event, content).await
}
RoomKeyContent::Unknown(_) => {
warn!("Received a room key with an unsupported algorithm");
Ok(None)
}
}
}
fn add_withheld_info(&self, changes: &mut Changes, event: &RoomKeyWithheldEvent) {
debug!(?event.content, "Processing `m.room_key.withheld` event");
if let RoomKeyWithheldContent::MegolmV1AesSha2(
MegolmV1AesSha2WithheldContent::BlackListed(c)
| MegolmV1AesSha2WithheldContent::Unverified(c),
) = &event.content
{
changes
.withheld_session_info
.entry(c.room_id.to_owned())
.or_default()
.insert(c.session_id.to_owned(), event.to_owned());
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) async fn create_outbound_group_session_with_defaults_test_helper(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
) -> OlmResult<()> {
let (_, session) = self
.inner
.group_session_manager
.create_outbound_group_session(
room_id,
EncryptionSettings::default(),
SenderData::unknown(),
)
.await?;
self.store().save_inbound_group_sessions(&[session]).await?;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) async fn create_inbound_session_test_helper(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
) -> OlmResult<InboundGroupSession> {
let (_, session) = self
.inner
.group_session_manager
.create_outbound_group_session(
room_id,
EncryptionSettings::default(),
SenderData::unknown(),
)
.await?;
Ok(session)
}
/// Encrypt a room message for the given room.
///
/// Beware that a room key needs to be shared before this method
/// can be called using the [`OlmMachine::share_room_key`] method.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room for which the message should be
/// encrypted.
///
/// * `content` - The plaintext content of the message that should be
/// encrypted.
///
/// # Panics
///
/// Panics if a room key for the given room wasn't shared beforehand.
pub async fn encrypt_room_event(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
content: impl MessageLikeEventContent,
) -> MegolmResult<Raw<RoomEncryptedEventContent>> {
let event_type = content.event_type().to_string();
let content = Raw::new(&content)?.cast();
self.encrypt_room_event_raw(room_id, &event_type, &content).await
}
/// Encrypt a raw JSON content for the given room.
///
/// This method is equivalent to the [`OlmMachine::encrypt_room_event()`]
/// method but operates on an arbitrary JSON value instead of strongly-typed
/// event content struct.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room for which the message should be
/// encrypted.
///
/// * `content` - The plaintext content of the message that should be
/// encrypted as a raw JSON value.
///
/// * `event_type` - The plaintext type of the event.
///
/// # Panics
///
/// Panics if a group session for the given room wasn't shared beforehand.
pub async fn encrypt_room_event_raw(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
event_type: &str,
content: &Raw<AnyMessageLikeEventContent>,
) -> MegolmResult<Raw<RoomEncryptedEventContent>> {
self.inner.group_session_manager.encrypt(room_id, event_type, content).await
}
/// Forces the currently active room key, which is used to encrypt messages,
/// to be rotated.
///
/// A new room key will be crated and shared with all the room members the
/// next time a message will be sent. You don't have to call this method,
/// room keys will be rotated automatically when necessary. This method is
/// still useful for debugging purposes.
///
/// Returns true if a session was invalidated, false if there was no session
/// to invalidate.
pub async fn discard_room_key(&self, room_id: &RoomId) -> StoreResult<bool> {
self.inner.group_session_manager.invalidate_group_session(room_id).await
}
/// Get to-device requests to share a room key with users in a room.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// `room_id` - The room id of the room where the room key will be
/// used.
///
/// `users` - The list of users that should receive the room key.
///
/// `settings` - Encryption settings that affect when are room keys rotated
/// and who are they shared with.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// List of the to-device requests that need to be sent out to the server
/// and the responses need to be passed back to the state machine with
/// [`mark_request_as_sent`], using the to-device `txn_id` as `request_id`.
///
/// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: #method.mark_request_as_sent
pub async fn share_room_key(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
users: impl Iterator<Item = &UserId>,
encryption_settings: impl Into<EncryptionSettings>,
) -> OlmResult<Vec<Arc<ToDeviceRequest>>> {
self.inner.group_session_manager.share_room_key(room_id, users, encryption_settings).await
}
/// Receive an unencrypted verification event.
///
/// This method can be used to pass verification events that are happening
/// in unencrypted rooms to the `OlmMachine`.
///
/// **Note**: This does not need to be called for encrypted events since
/// those will get passed to the `OlmMachine` during decryption.
#[deprecated(note = "Use OlmMachine::receive_verification_event instead", since = "0.7.0")]
pub async fn receive_unencrypted_verification_event(
&self,
event: &AnyMessageLikeEvent,
) -> StoreResult<()> {
self.inner.verification_machine.receive_any_event(event).await
}
/// Receive a verification event.
///
/// in rooms to the `OlmMachine`. The event should be in the decrypted form.
/// in rooms to the `OlmMachine`.
pub async fn receive_verification_event(&self, event: &AnyMessageLikeEvent) -> StoreResult<()> {
self.inner.verification_machine.receive_any_event(event).await
}
/// Receive and properly handle a decrypted to-device event.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `decrypted` - The decrypted event and some associated metadata.
#[instrument(
skip_all,
fields(
sender_key = ?decrypted.result.sender_key,
event_type = decrypted.result.event.event_type(),
),
)]
async fn handle_decrypted_to_device_event(
&self,
cache: &StoreCache,
decrypted: &mut OlmDecryptionInfo,
changes: &mut Changes,
) -> OlmResult<()> {
debug!(
sender_device_keys =
?decrypted.result.event.sender_device_keys().map(|k| (k.curve25519_key(), k.ed25519_key())).unwrap_or((None, None)),
"Received a decrypted to-device event",
);
match &*decrypted.result.event {
AnyDecryptedOlmEvent::RoomKey(e) => {
let session = self.add_room_key(decrypted.result.sender_key, e).await?;
decrypted.inbound_group_session = session;
}
AnyDecryptedOlmEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(e) => {
let session = self
.inner
.key_request_machine
.receive_forwarded_room_key(decrypted.result.sender_key, e)
.await?;
decrypted.inbound_group_session = session;
}
AnyDecryptedOlmEvent::SecretSend(e) => {
let name = self
.inner
.key_request_machine
.receive_secret_event(cache, decrypted.result.sender_key, e, changes)
.await?;
// Set the secret name so other consumers of the event know
// what this event is about.
if let Ok(ToDeviceEvents::SecretSend(mut e)) =
decrypted.result.raw_event.deserialize_as()
{
e.content.secret_name = name;
decrypted.result.raw_event = Raw::from_json(to_raw_value(&e)?);
}
}
AnyDecryptedOlmEvent::Dummy(_) => {
debug!("Received an `m.dummy` event");
}
AnyDecryptedOlmEvent::Custom(_) => {
warn!("Received an unexpected encrypted to-device event");
}
}
Ok(())
}
async fn handle_verification_event(&self, event: &ToDeviceEvents) {
if let Err(e) = self.inner.verification_machine.receive_any_event(event).await {
error!("Error handling a verification event: {e:?}");
}
}
/// Mark an outgoing to-device requests as sent.
async fn mark_to_device_request_as_sent(&self, request_id: &TransactionId) -> StoreResult<()> {
self.inner.verification_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id);
self.inner.key_request_machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(request_id).await?;
self.inner.group_session_manager.mark_request_as_sent(request_id).await?;
self.inner.session_manager.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(request_id);
Ok(())
}
/// Get a verification object for the given user id with the given flow id.
pub fn get_verification(&self, user_id: &UserId, flow_id: &str) -> Option<Verification> {
self.inner.verification_machine.get_verification(user_id, flow_id)
}
/// Get a verification request object with the given flow id.
pub fn get_verification_request(
&self,
user_id: &UserId,
flow_id: impl AsRef<str>,
) -> Option<VerificationRequest> {
self.inner.verification_machine.get_request(user_id, flow_id)
}
/// Get all the verification requests of a given user.
pub fn get_verification_requests(&self, user_id: &UserId) -> Vec<VerificationRequest> {
self.inner.verification_machine.get_requests(user_id)
}
async fn handle_to_device_event(&self, changes: &mut Changes, event: &ToDeviceEvents) {
use crate::types::events::ToDeviceEvents::*;
match event {
RoomKeyRequest(e) => self.inner.key_request_machine.receive_incoming_key_request(e),
SecretRequest(e) => self.inner.key_request_machine.receive_incoming_secret_request(e),
RoomKeyWithheld(e) => self.add_withheld_info(changes, e),
KeyVerificationAccept(..)
| KeyVerificationCancel(..)
| KeyVerificationKey(..)
| KeyVerificationMac(..)
| KeyVerificationRequest(..)
| KeyVerificationReady(..)
| KeyVerificationDone(..)
| KeyVerificationStart(..) => {
self.handle_verification_event(event).await;
}
Dummy(_) | RoomKey(_) | ForwardedRoomKey(_) | RoomEncrypted(_) => {}
_ => {}
}
}
fn record_message_id(event: &Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>) {
use serde::Deserialize;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ContentStub<'a> {
#[serde(borrow, rename = "org.matrix.msgid")]
message_id: Option<&'a str>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct ToDeviceStub<'a> {
sender: &'a str,
#[serde(rename = "type")]
event_type: &'a str,
#[serde(borrow)]
content: ContentStub<'a>,
}
if let Ok(event) = event.deserialize_as::<ToDeviceStub<'_>>() {
Span::current().record("sender", event.sender);
Span::current().record("event_type", event.event_type);
Span::current().record("message_id", event.content.message_id);
}
}
#[instrument(skip_all, fields(sender, event_type, message_id))]
async fn receive_to_device_event(
&self,
transaction: &mut StoreTransaction,
changes: &mut Changes,
mut raw_event: Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>,
) -> Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent> {
Self::record_message_id(&raw_event);
let event: ToDeviceEvents = match raw_event.deserialize_as() {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(e) => {
// Skip invalid events.
warn!("Received an invalid to-device event: {e}");
return raw_event;
}
};
debug!("Received a to-device event");
match event {
ToDeviceEvents::RoomEncrypted(e) => {
let decrypted = match self.decrypt_to_device_event(transaction, &e, changes).await {
Ok(e) => e,
Err(err) => {
if let OlmError::SessionWedged(sender, curve_key) = err {
if let Err(e) = self
.inner
.session_manager
.mark_device_as_wedged(&sender, curve_key)
.await
{
error!(
error = ?e,
"Couldn't mark device from to be unwedged",
);
}
}
return raw_event;
}
};
// New sessions modify the account so we need to save that
// one as well.
match decrypted.session {
SessionType::New(s) | SessionType::Existing(s) => {
changes.sessions.push(s);
}
}
changes.message_hashes.push(decrypted.message_hash);
if let Some(group_session) = decrypted.inbound_group_session {
changes.inbound_group_sessions.push(group_session);
}
match decrypted.result.raw_event.deserialize_as() {
Ok(event) => {
self.handle_to_device_event(changes, &event).await;
raw_event = event
.serialize_zeroized()
.expect("Zeroizing and reserializing our events should always work")
.cast();
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("Received an invalid encrypted to-device event: {e}");
raw_event = decrypted.result.raw_event;
}
}
}
e => self.handle_to_device_event(changes, &e).await,
}
raw_event
}
/// Handle a to-device and one-time key counts from a sync response.
///
/// This will decrypt and handle to-device events returning the decrypted
/// versions of them.
///
/// To decrypt an event from the room timeline, call [`decrypt_room_event`].
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `sync_changes` - an [`EncryptionSyncChanges`] value, constructed from
/// a sync response.
///
/// [`decrypt_room_event`]: #method.decrypt_room_event
///
/// # Returns
///
/// A tuple of (decrypted to-device events, updated room keys).
#[instrument(skip_all)]
pub async fn receive_sync_changes(
&self,
sync_changes: EncryptionSyncChanges<'_>,
) -> OlmResult<(Vec<Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>>, Vec<RoomKeyInfo>)> {
let mut store_transaction = self.inner.store.transaction().await;
let (events, changes) =
self.preprocess_sync_changes(&mut store_transaction, sync_changes).await?;
// Technically save_changes also does the same work, so if it's slow we could
// refactor this to do it only once.
let room_key_updates: Vec<_> =
changes.inbound_group_sessions.iter().map(RoomKeyInfo::from).collect();
self.store().save_changes(changes).await?;
store_transaction.commit().await?;
Ok((events, room_key_updates))
}
pub(crate) async fn preprocess_sync_changes(
&self,
transaction: &mut StoreTransaction,
sync_changes: EncryptionSyncChanges<'_>,
) -> OlmResult<(Vec<Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>>, Changes)> {
// Remove verification objects that have expired or are done.
let mut events = self.inner.verification_machine.garbage_collect();
// The account is automatically saved by the store transaction created by the
// caller.
let mut changes = Default::default();
{
let account = transaction.account().await?;
account.update_key_counts(
sync_changes.one_time_keys_counts,
sync_changes.unused_fallback_keys,
)
}
if let Err(e) = self
.inner
.identity_manager
.receive_device_changes(
transaction.cache(),
sync_changes.changed_devices.changed.iter().map(|u| u.as_ref()),
)
.await
{
error!(error = ?e, "Error marking a tracked user as changed");
}
for raw_event in sync_changes.to_device_events {
let raw_event =
Box::pin(self.receive_to_device_event(transaction, &mut changes, raw_event)).await;
events.push(raw_event);
}
let changed_sessions = self
.inner
.key_request_machine
.collect_incoming_key_requests(transaction.cache())
.await?;
changes.sessions.extend(changed_sessions);
changes.next_batch_token = sync_changes.next_batch_token;
Ok((events, changes))
}
/// Request a room key from our devices.
///
/// This method will return a request cancellation and a new key request if
/// the key was already requested, otherwise it will return just the key
/// request.
///
/// The request cancellation *must* be sent out before the request is sent
/// out, otherwise devices will ignore the key request.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room where the key is used in.
///
/// * `sender_key` - The curve25519 key of the sender that owns the key.
///
/// * `session_id` - The id that uniquely identifies the session.
pub async fn request_room_key(
&self,
event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
room_id: &RoomId,
) -> MegolmResult<(Option<OutgoingRequest>, OutgoingRequest)> {
let event = event.deserialize()?;
self.inner.key_request_machine.request_key(room_id, &event).await
}
/// Find whether the supplied session is verified, and provide
/// explanation of what is missing/wrong if not.
///
/// Checks both the stored verification state of the session and a
/// recalculated verification state based on our current knowledge, and
/// returns the more trusted of the two.
///
/// Store the updated [`SenderData`] for this session in the store
/// if we find an updated value for it.
async fn get_or_update_verification_state(
&self,
session: &InboundGroupSession,
sender: &UserId,
) -> MegolmResult<(VerificationState, Option<OwnedDeviceId>)> {
/// Whether we should recalculate the Megolm sender's data, given the
/// current sender data. We only want to recalculate if it might
/// increase trust and allow us to decrypt messages that we
/// otherwise might refuse to decrypt.
///
/// We recalculate for all states except:
///
/// - SenderUnverified: the sender is trusted enough that we will
/// decrypt their messages in all cases, or
/// - SenderVerified: the sender is the most trusted they can be.
fn should_recalculate_sender_data(sender_data: &SenderData) -> bool {
matches!(
sender_data,
SenderData::UnknownDevice { .. }
| SenderData::DeviceInfo { .. }
| SenderData::VerificationViolation { .. }
)
}
let sender_data = if should_recalculate_sender_data(&session.sender_data) {
// The session is not sure of the sender yet. Calculate it.
let calculated_sender_data = SenderDataFinder::find_using_curve_key(
self.store(),
session.sender_key(),
sender,
session,
)
.await?;
// Is the newly-calculated sender data more trusted?
if calculated_sender_data.compare_trust_level(&session.sender_data).is_gt() {
// Yes - save it to the store
let mut new_session = session.clone();
new_session.sender_data = calculated_sender_data.clone();
self.store().save_inbound_group_sessions(&[new_session]).await?;
// and use it now.
calculated_sender_data
} else {
// No - use the existing data.
session.sender_data.clone()
}
} else {
session.sender_data.clone()
};
Ok(sender_data_to_verification_state(sender_data, session.has_been_imported()))
}
/// Request missing local secrets from our devices (cross signing private
/// keys, megolm backup). This will ask the sdk to create outgoing
/// request to get the missing secrets.
///
/// The requests will be processed as soon as `outgoing_requests()` is
/// called to process them.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// A bool result saying if actual secrets were missing and have been
/// requested
///
/// # Examples
//
/// ```
/// # async {
/// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::OlmMachine;
/// # let machine: OlmMachine = unimplemented!();
/// if machine.query_missing_secrets_from_other_sessions().await.unwrap() {
/// let to_send = machine.outgoing_requests().await.unwrap();
/// // send the to device requests
/// };
/// # anyhow::Ok(()) };
/// ```
pub async fn query_missing_secrets_from_other_sessions(&self) -> StoreResult<bool> {
let identity = self.inner.user_identity.lock().await;
let mut secrets = identity.get_missing_secrets().await;
if self.store().load_backup_keys().await?.decryption_key.is_none() {
secrets.push(SecretName::RecoveryKey);
}
if secrets.is_empty() {
debug!("No missing requests to query");
return Ok(false);
}
let secret_requests = GossipMachine::request_missing_secrets(self.user_id(), secrets);
// Check if there are already in-flight requests for these secrets?
let unsent_request = self.store().get_unsent_secret_requests().await?;
let not_yet_requested = secret_requests
.into_iter()
.filter(|request| !unsent_request.iter().any(|unsent| unsent.info == request.info))
.collect_vec();
if not_yet_requested.is_empty() {
debug!("The missing secrets have already been requested");
Ok(false)
} else {
debug!("Requesting missing secrets");
let changes = Changes { key_requests: not_yet_requested, ..Default::default() };
self.store().save_changes(changes).await?;
Ok(true)
}
}
/// Get some metadata pertaining to a given group session.
///
/// This includes the session owner's Matrix user ID, their device ID, info
/// regarding the cryptographic algorithm and whether the session, and by
/// extension the events decrypted by the session, are trusted.
async fn get_encryption_info(
&self,
session: &InboundGroupSession,
sender: &UserId,
) -> MegolmResult<EncryptionInfo> {
let (verification_state, device_id) =
self.get_or_update_verification_state(session, sender).await?;
let sender = sender.to_owned();
Ok(EncryptionInfo {
sender,
sender_device: device_id,
algorithm_info: AlgorithmInfo::MegolmV1AesSha2 {
curve25519_key: session.sender_key().to_base64(),
sender_claimed_keys: session
.signing_keys()
.iter()
.map(|(k, v)| (k.to_owned(), v.to_base64()))
.collect(),
},
verification_state,
})
}
async fn get_megolm_encryption_info(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
event: &EncryptedEvent,
content: &SupportedEventEncryptionSchemes<'_>,
) -> MegolmResult<EncryptionInfo> {
let session =
self.get_inbound_group_session_or_error(room_id, content.session_id()).await?;
self.get_encryption_info(&session, &event.sender).await
}
async fn decrypt_megolm_events(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
event: &EncryptedEvent,
content: &SupportedEventEncryptionSchemes<'_>,
decryption_settings: &DecryptionSettings,
) -> MegolmResult<(JsonObject, EncryptionInfo)> {
let session =
self.get_inbound_group_session_or_error(room_id, content.session_id()).await?;
// This function is only ever called by decrypt_room_event, so
// room_id, sender, algorithm and session_id are recorded already
//
// While we already record the sender key in some cases from the event, the
// sender key in the event is deprecated, so let's record it now.
Span::current().record("sender_key", debug(session.sender_key()));
let result = session.decrypt(event).await;
match result {
Ok((decrypted_event, _)) => {
let encryption_info = self.get_encryption_info(&session, &event.sender).await?;
self.check_sender_trust_requirement(
&session,
&encryption_info,
&decryption_settings.sender_device_trust_requirement,
)?;
Ok((decrypted_event, encryption_info))
}
Err(error) => Err(
if let MegolmError::Decryption(DecryptionError::UnknownMessageIndex(_, _)) = error {
let withheld_code = self
.inner
.store
.get_withheld_info(room_id, content.session_id())
.await?
.map(|e| e.content.withheld_code());
if withheld_code.is_some() {
// Partially withheld, report with a withheld code if we have one.
MegolmError::MissingRoomKey(withheld_code)
} else {
error
}
} else {
error
},
),
}
}
/// Check that the sender of a Megolm session satisfies the trust
/// requirement from the decryption settings.
fn check_sender_trust_requirement(
&self,
session: &InboundGroupSession,
encryption_info: &EncryptionInfo,
trust_requirement: &TrustRequirement,
) -> MegolmResult<()> {
/// Get the error from the encryption information.
fn encryption_info_to_error(encryption_info: &EncryptionInfo) -> MegolmResult<()> {
// When this is called, the verification state *must* be unverified,
// otherwise the sender_data would have been SenderVerified
let VerificationState::Unverified(verification_level) =
&encryption_info.verification_state
else {
unreachable!("inconsistent verification state");
};
Err(MegolmError::SenderIdentityNotTrusted(verification_level.clone()))
}
match trust_requirement {
TrustRequirement::Untrusted => Ok(()),
TrustRequirement::CrossSignedOrLegacy => match &session.sender_data {
// Reject if the sender was previously verified, but changed
// their identity and is not verified any more.
SenderData::VerificationViolation(..) => Err(
MegolmError::SenderIdentityNotTrusted(VerificationLevel::VerificationViolation),
),
SenderData::SenderUnverified(..) => Ok(()),
SenderData::SenderVerified(..) => Ok(()),
SenderData::DeviceInfo { legacy_session: true, .. } => Ok(()),
SenderData::UnknownDevice { legacy_session: true, .. } => Ok(()),
_ => encryption_info_to_error(encryption_info),
},
TrustRequirement::CrossSigned => match &session.sender_data {
// Reject if the sender was previously verified, but changed
// their identity and is not verified any more.
SenderData::VerificationViolation(..) => Err(
MegolmError::SenderIdentityNotTrusted(VerificationLevel::VerificationViolation),
),
SenderData::SenderUnverified(..) => Ok(()),
SenderData::SenderVerified(..) => Ok(()),
_ => encryption_info_to_error(encryption_info),
},
}
}
/// Attempt to retrieve an inbound group session from the store.
///
/// If the session is not found, checks for withheld reports, and returns a
/// [`MegolmError::MissingRoomKey`] error.
async fn get_inbound_group_session_or_error(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
session_id: &str,
) -> MegolmResult<InboundGroupSession> {
match self.store().get_inbound_group_session(room_id, session_id).await? {
Some(session) => Ok(session),
None => {
let withheld_code = self
.inner
.store
.get_withheld_info(room_id, session_id)
.await?
.map(|e| e.content.withheld_code());
Err(MegolmError::MissingRoomKey(withheld_code))
}
}
}
/// Attempt to decrypt an event from a room timeline, returning information
/// on the failure if it fails.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `event` - The event that should be decrypted.
///
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// The decrypted event, if it was successfully decrypted. Otherwise,
/// information on the failure, unless the failure was due to an
/// internal error, in which case, an `Err` result.
pub async fn try_decrypt_room_event(
&self,
raw_event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
room_id: &RoomId,
decryption_settings: &DecryptionSettings,
) -> Result<RoomEventDecryptionResult, CryptoStoreError> {
match self.decrypt_room_event_inner(raw_event, room_id, true, decryption_settings).await {
Ok(decrypted) => Ok(RoomEventDecryptionResult::Decrypted(decrypted)),
Err(err) => Ok(RoomEventDecryptionResult::UnableToDecrypt(megolm_error_to_utd_info(
raw_event, err,
)?)),
}
}
/// Decrypt an event from a room timeline.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `event` - The event that should be decrypted.
///
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
pub async fn decrypt_room_event(
&self,
event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
room_id: &RoomId,
decryption_settings: &DecryptionSettings,
) -> MegolmResult<DecryptedRoomEvent> {
self.decrypt_room_event_inner(event, room_id, true, decryption_settings).await
}
#[instrument(name = "decrypt_room_event", skip_all, fields(?room_id, event_id, origin_server_ts, sender, algorithm, session_id, message_index, sender_key))]
async fn decrypt_room_event_inner(
&self,
event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
room_id: &RoomId,
decrypt_unsigned: bool,
decryption_settings: &DecryptionSettings,
) -> MegolmResult<DecryptedRoomEvent> {
let event = event.deserialize()?;
Span::current()
.record("sender", debug(&event.sender))
.record("event_id", debug(&event.event_id))
.record(
"origin_server_ts",
timestamp_to_iso8601(event.origin_server_ts)
.unwrap_or_else(|| "<out of range>".to_owned()),
)
.record("algorithm", debug(event.content.algorithm()));
let content: SupportedEventEncryptionSchemes<'_> = match &event.content.scheme {
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => {
Span::current().record("sender_key", debug(c.sender_key));
c.into()
}
#[cfg(feature = "experimental-algorithms")]
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV2AesSha2(c) => c.into(),
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::Unknown(_) => {
warn!("Received an encrypted room event with an unsupported algorithm");
return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into());
}
};
Span::current().record("session_id", content.session_id());
Span::current().record("message_index", content.message_index());
let result =
self.decrypt_megolm_events(room_id, &event, &content, decryption_settings).await;
if let Err(e) = &result {
#[cfg(feature = "automatic-room-key-forwarding")]
match e {
// Optimisation should we request if we received a withheld code?
// Maybe for some code there is no point
MegolmError::MissingRoomKey(_)
| MegolmError::Decryption(DecryptionError::UnknownMessageIndex(_, _)) => {
self.inner
.key_request_machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(room_id, &event)
.await?;
}
_ => {}
}
warn!("Failed to decrypt a room event: {e}");
}
let (mut decrypted_event, encryption_info) = result?;
let mut unsigned_encryption_info = None;
if decrypt_unsigned {
// Try to decrypt encrypted unsigned events.
unsigned_encryption_info = self
.decrypt_unsigned_events(&mut decrypted_event, room_id, decryption_settings)
.await;
}
let event = serde_json::from_value::<Raw<AnyMessageLikeEvent>>(decrypted_event.into())?;
Ok(DecryptedRoomEvent { event, encryption_info, unsigned_encryption_info })
}
/// Try to decrypt the events bundled in the `unsigned` object of the given
/// event.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `main_event` - The event that may contain bundled encrypted events in
/// its `unsigned` object.
///
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
async fn decrypt_unsigned_events(
&self,
main_event: &mut JsonObject,
room_id: &RoomId,
decryption_settings: &DecryptionSettings,
) -> Option<BTreeMap<UnsignedEventLocation, UnsignedDecryptionResult>> {
let unsigned = main_event.get_mut("unsigned")?.as_object_mut()?;
let mut unsigned_encryption_info: Option<
BTreeMap<UnsignedEventLocation, UnsignedDecryptionResult>,
> = None;
// Search for an encrypted event in `m.replace`, an edit.
let location = UnsignedEventLocation::RelationsReplace;
let replace = location.find_mut(unsigned);
if let Some(decryption_result) =
self.decrypt_unsigned_event(replace, room_id, decryption_settings).await
{
unsigned_encryption_info
.get_or_insert_with(Default::default)
.insert(location, decryption_result);
}
// Search for an encrypted event in `latest_event` in `m.thread`, the
// latest event of a thread.
let location = UnsignedEventLocation::RelationsThreadLatestEvent;
let thread_latest_event = location.find_mut(unsigned);
if let Some(decryption_result) =
self.decrypt_unsigned_event(thread_latest_event, room_id, decryption_settings).await
{
unsigned_encryption_info
.get_or_insert_with(Default::default)
.insert(location, decryption_result);
}
unsigned_encryption_info
}
/// Try to decrypt the given bundled event.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `event` - The bundled event that may be encrypted
///
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
fn decrypt_unsigned_event<'a>(
&'a self,
event: Option<&'a mut Value>,
room_id: &'a RoomId,
decryption_settings: &'a DecryptionSettings,
) -> BoxFuture<'a, Option<UnsignedDecryptionResult>> {
Box::pin(async move {
let event = event?;
let is_encrypted = event
.get("type")
.and_then(|type_| type_.as_str())
.is_some_and(|s| s == "m.room.encrypted");
if !is_encrypted {
return None;
}
let raw_event = serde_json::from_value(event.clone()).ok()?;
match self
.decrypt_room_event_inner(&raw_event, room_id, false, decryption_settings)
.await
{
Ok(decrypted_event) => {
// Replace the encrypted event.
*event = serde_json::to_value(decrypted_event.event).ok()?;
Some(UnsignedDecryptionResult::Decrypted(decrypted_event.encryption_info))
}
Err(err) => {
// For now, we throw away crypto store errors and just treat the unsigned event
// as unencrypted. Crypto store errors represent problems with the application
// rather than normal UTD errors, so they should probably be propagated
// rather than swallowed.
let utd_info = megolm_error_to_utd_info(&raw_event, err).ok()?;
Some(UnsignedDecryptionResult::UnableToDecrypt(utd_info))
}
}
})
}
/// Check if we have the room key for the given event in the store.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `event` - The event to get information for.
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
pub async fn is_room_key_available(
&self,
event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
room_id: &RoomId,
) -> Result<bool, CryptoStoreError> {
let event = event.deserialize()?;
let (session_id, message_index) = match &event.content.scheme {
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => {
(&c.session_id, c.ciphertext.message_index())
}
#[cfg(feature = "experimental-algorithms")]
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV2AesSha2(c) => {
(&c.session_id, c.ciphertext.message_index())
}
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::Unknown(_) => {
// We don't support this encryption algorithm, so clearly don't have its key.
return Ok(false);
}
};
// Check that we have the session in the store, and that its first known index
// predates the index of our message.
Ok(self
.store()
.get_inbound_group_session(room_id, session_id)
.await?
.filter(|s| s.first_known_index() <= message_index)
.is_some())
}
/// Get encryption info for a decrypted timeline event.
///
/// This recalculates the [`EncryptionInfo`] data that is returned by
/// [`OlmMachine::decrypt_room_event`], based on the current
/// verification status of the sender, etc.
///
/// Returns an error for an unencrypted event.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `event` - The event to get information for.
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
pub async fn get_room_event_encryption_info(
&self,
event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
room_id: &RoomId,
) -> MegolmResult<EncryptionInfo> {
let event = event.deserialize()?;
let content: SupportedEventEncryptionSchemes<'_> = match &event.content.scheme {
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => c.into(),
#[cfg(feature = "experimental-algorithms")]
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV2AesSha2(c) => c.into(),
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::Unknown(_) => {
return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into());
}
};
self.get_megolm_encryption_info(room_id, &event, &content).await
}
/// Update the list of tracked users.
///
/// The OlmMachine maintains a list of users whose devices we are keeping
/// track of: these are known as "tracked users". These must be users
/// that we share a room with, so that the server sends us updates for
/// their device lists.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `users` - An iterator over user ids that should be added to the list
/// of tracked users
///
/// Any users that hadn't been seen before will be flagged for a key query
/// immediately, and whenever [`OlmMachine::receive_sync_changes()`]
/// receives a "changed" notification for that user in the future.
///
/// Users that were already in the list are unaffected.
pub async fn update_tracked_users(
&self,
users: impl IntoIterator<Item = &UserId>,
) -> StoreResult<()> {
self.inner.identity_manager.update_tracked_users(users).await
}
/// Mark all tracked users as dirty.
///
/// All users *whose device lists we are tracking* are flagged as needing a
/// key query. Users whose devices we are not tracking are ignored.
pub async fn mark_all_tracked_users_as_dirty(&self) -> StoreResult<()> {
self.inner
.identity_manager
.mark_all_tracked_users_as_dirty(self.inner.store.cache().await?)
.await
}
async fn wait_if_user_pending(
&self,
user_id: &UserId,
timeout: Option<Duration>,
) -> StoreResult<()> {
if let Some(timeout) = timeout {
let cache = self.store().cache().await?;
self.inner
.identity_manager
.key_query_manager
.wait_if_user_key_query_pending(cache, timeout, user_id)
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Get a specific device of a user.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that the device belongs to.
///
/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device.
///
/// * `timeout` - The amount of time we should wait before returning if the
/// user's device list has been marked as stale. **Note**, this assumes that
/// the requests from [`OlmMachine::outgoing_requests`] are being
/// processed and sent out.
///
/// Returns a `Device` if one is found and the crypto store didn't throw an
/// error.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::OlmMachine;
/// # use ruma::{device_id, user_id};
/// # let alice = user_id!("@alice:example.org").to_owned();
/// # futures_executor::block_on(async {
/// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, device_id!("DEVICEID")).await;
/// let device = machine.get_device(&alice, device_id!("DEVICEID"), None).await;
///
/// println!("{:?}", device);
/// # });
/// ```
#[instrument(skip(self))]
pub async fn get_device(
&self,
user_id: &UserId,
device_id: &DeviceId,
timeout: Option<Duration>,
) -> StoreResult<Option<Device>> {
self.wait_if_user_pending(user_id, timeout).await?;
self.store().get_device(user_id, device_id).await
}
/// Get the cross signing user identity of a user.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that the identity belongs to
///
/// * `timeout` - The amount of time we should wait before returning if the
/// user's device list has been marked as stale. **Note**, this assumes that
/// the requests from [`OlmMachine::outgoing_requests`] are being
/// processed and sent out.
///
/// Returns a [`UserIdentity`] enum if one is found and the crypto store
/// didn't throw an error.
#[instrument(skip(self))]
pub async fn get_identity(
&self,
user_id: &UserId,
timeout: Option<Duration>,
) -> StoreResult<Option<UserIdentity>> {
self.wait_if_user_pending(user_id, timeout).await?;
self.store().get_identity(user_id).await
}
/// Get a map holding all the devices of an user.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that the devices belong to.
///
/// * `timeout` - The amount of time we should wait before returning if the
/// user's device list has been marked as stale. **Note**, this assumes that
/// the requests from [`OlmMachine::outgoing_requests`] are being
/// processed and sent out.
///
/// # Examples
///
/// ```
/// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::OlmMachine;
/// # use ruma::{device_id, user_id};
/// # let alice = user_id!("@alice:example.org").to_owned();
/// # futures_executor::block_on(async {
/// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, device_id!("DEVICEID")).await;
/// let devices = machine.get_user_devices(&alice, None).await.unwrap();
///
/// for device in devices.devices() {
/// println!("{:?}", device);
/// }
/// # });
/// ```
#[instrument(skip(self))]
pub async fn get_user_devices(
&self,
user_id: &UserId,
timeout: Option<Duration>,
) -> StoreResult<UserDevices> {
self.wait_if_user_pending(user_id, timeout).await?;
self.store().get_user_devices(user_id).await
}
/// Get the status of the private cross signing keys.
///
/// This can be used to check which private cross signing keys we have
/// stored locally.
pub async fn cross_signing_status(&self) -> CrossSigningStatus {
self.inner.user_identity.lock().await.status().await
}
/// Export all the private cross signing keys we have.
///
/// The export will contain the seed for the ed25519 keys as a unpadded
/// base64 encoded string.
///
/// This method returns `None` if we don't have any private cross signing
/// keys.
pub async fn export_cross_signing_keys(&self) -> StoreResult<Option<CrossSigningKeyExport>> {
let master_key = self.store().export_secret(&SecretName::CrossSigningMasterKey).await?;
let self_signing_key =
self.store().export_secret(&SecretName::CrossSigningSelfSigningKey).await?;
let user_signing_key =
self.store().export_secret(&SecretName::CrossSigningUserSigningKey).await?;
Ok(if master_key.is_none() && self_signing_key.is_none() && user_signing_key.is_none() {
None
} else {
Some(CrossSigningKeyExport { master_key, self_signing_key, user_signing_key })
})
}
/// Import our private cross signing keys.
///
/// The export needs to contain the seed for the ed25519 keys as an unpadded
/// base64 encoded string.
pub async fn import_cross_signing_keys(
&self,
export: CrossSigningKeyExport,
) -> Result<CrossSigningStatus, SecretImportError> {
self.store().import_cross_signing_keys(export).await
}
async fn sign_with_master_key(
&self,
message: &str,
) -> Result<(OwnedDeviceKeyId, Ed25519Signature), SignatureError> {
let identity = &*self.inner.user_identity.lock().await;
let key_id = identity.master_key_id().await.ok_or(SignatureError::MissingSigningKey)?;
let signature = identity.sign(message).await?;
Ok((key_id, signature))
}
/// Sign the given message using our device key and if available cross
/// signing master key.
///
/// Presently, this should only be used for signing the server-side room
/// key backups.
pub async fn sign(&self, message: &str) -> Result<Signatures, CryptoStoreError> {
let mut signatures = Signatures::new();
{
let cache = self.inner.store.cache().await?;
let account = cache.account().await?;
let key_id = account.signing_key_id();
let signature = account.sign(message);
signatures.add_signature(self.user_id().to_owned(), key_id, signature);
}
match self.sign_with_master_key(message).await {
Ok((key_id, signature)) => {
signatures.add_signature(self.user_id().to_owned(), key_id, signature);
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(error = ?e, "Couldn't sign the message using the cross signing master key")
}
}
Ok(signatures)
}
/// Get a reference to the backup related state machine.
///
/// This state machine can be used to incrementally backup all room keys to
/// the server.
pub fn backup_machine(&self) -> &BackupMachine {
&self.inner.backup_machine
}
/// Syncs the database and in-memory generation counter.
///
/// This requires that the crypto store lock has been acquired already.
pub async fn initialize_crypto_store_generation(
&self,
generation: &Mutex<Option<u64>>,
) -> StoreResult<()> {
// Avoid reentrant initialization by taking the lock for the entire's function
// scope.
let mut gen_guard = generation.lock().await;
let prev_generation =
self.inner.store.get_custom_value(Self::CURRENT_GENERATION_STORE_KEY).await?;
let gen = match prev_generation {
Some(val) => {
// There was a value in the store. We need to signal that we're a different
// process, so we don't just reuse the value but increment it.
u64::from_le_bytes(val.try_into().map_err(|_| {
CryptoStoreError::InvalidLockGeneration("invalid format".to_owned())
})?)
.wrapping_add(1)
}
None => 0,
};
tracing::debug!("Initialising crypto store generation at {}", gen);
self.inner
.store
.set_custom_value(Self::CURRENT_GENERATION_STORE_KEY, gen.to_le_bytes().to_vec())
.await?;
*gen_guard = Some(gen);
Ok(())
}
/// If needs be, update the local and on-disk crypto store generation.
///
/// ## Requirements
///
/// - This assumes that `initialize_crypto_store_generation` has been called
/// beforehand.
/// - This requires that the crypto store lock has been acquired.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `generation` - The in-memory generation counter (or rather, the
/// `Mutex` wrapping it). This defines the "expected" generation on entry,
/// and, if we determine an update is needed, is updated to hold the "new"
/// generation.
///
/// # Returns
///
/// A tuple containing:
///
/// * A `bool`, set to `true` if another process has updated the generation
/// number in the `Store` since our expected value, and as such we've
/// incremented and updated it in the database. Otherwise, `false`.
///
/// * The (possibly updated) generation counter.
pub async fn maintain_crypto_store_generation<'a>(
&'a self,
generation: &Mutex<Option<u64>>,
) -> StoreResult<(bool, u64)> {
let mut gen_guard = generation.lock().await;
// The database value must be there:
// - either we could initialize beforehand, thus write into the database,
// - or we couldn't, and then another process was holding onto the database's
// lock, thus
// has written a generation counter in there.
let actual_gen = self
.inner
.store
.get_custom_value(Self::CURRENT_GENERATION_STORE_KEY)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| {
CryptoStoreError::InvalidLockGeneration("counter missing in store".to_owned())
})?;
let actual_gen =
u64::from_le_bytes(actual_gen.try_into().map_err(|_| {
CryptoStoreError::InvalidLockGeneration("invalid format".to_owned())
})?);
let new_gen = match gen_guard.as_ref() {
Some(expected_gen) => {
if actual_gen == *expected_gen {
return Ok((false, actual_gen));
}
// Increment the biggest, and store it everywhere.
actual_gen.max(*expected_gen).wrapping_add(1)
}
None => {
// Some other process hold onto the lock when initializing, so we must reload.
// Increment database value, and store it everywhere.
actual_gen.wrapping_add(1)
}
};
tracing::debug!(
"Crypto store generation mismatch: previously known was {:?}, actual is {:?}, next is {}",
*gen_guard,
actual_gen,
new_gen
);
// Update known value.
*gen_guard = Some(new_gen);
// Update value in database.
self.inner
.store
.set_custom_value(Self::CURRENT_GENERATION_STORE_KEY, new_gen.to_le_bytes().to_vec())
.await?;
Ok((true, new_gen))
}
/// Manage dehydrated devices.
pub fn dehydrated_devices(&self) -> DehydratedDevices {
DehydratedDevices { inner: self.to_owned() }
}
/// Get the stored encryption settings for the given room, such as the
/// encryption algorithm or whether to encrypt only for trusted devices.
///
/// These settings can be modified via [`OlmMachine::set_room_settings`].
pub async fn room_settings(&self, room_id: &RoomId) -> StoreResult<Option<RoomSettings>> {
// There's not much to do here: it's just exposed for symmetry with
// `set_room_settings`.
self.inner.store.get_room_settings(room_id).await
}
/// Store encryption settings for the given room.
///
/// This method checks if the new settings are "safe" -- ie, that they do
/// not represent a downgrade in encryption security from any previous
/// settings. Attempts to downgrade security will result in a
/// [`SetRoomSettingsError::EncryptionDowngrade`].
///
/// If the settings are valid, they will be persisted to the crypto store.
/// These settings are not used directly by this library, but the saved
/// settings can be retrieved via [`OlmMachine::room_settings`].
pub async fn set_room_settings(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
new_settings: &RoomSettings,
) -> Result<(), SetRoomSettingsError> {
let store = &self.inner.store;
// We want to make sure that we do not race against a second concurrent call to
// `set_room_settings`. By way of an easy way to do so, we start a
// StoreTransaction. There's no need to commit() it: we're just using it as a
// lock guard.
let _store_transaction = store.transaction().await;
let old_settings = store.get_room_settings(room_id).await?;
// We want to make sure that the change to the room settings does not represent
// a downgrade in security. The [E2EE implementation guide] recommends:
//
// > This flag should **not** be cleared if a later `m.room.encryption` event
// > changes the configuration.
//
// (However, it doesn't really address how to handle changes to the rotation
// parameters, etc.) For now at least, we are very conservative here:
// any new settings are rejected if they differ from the existing settings.
// merit improvement (cf https://github.com/element-hq/element-meta/issues/69).
//
// [E2EE implementation guide]: https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/#handling-an-m-room-encryption-state-event
if let Some(old_settings) = old_settings {
if old_settings != *new_settings {
return Err(SetRoomSettingsError::EncryptionDowngrade);
} else {
// nothing to do here
return Ok(());
}
}
// Make sure that the new settings are valid
match new_settings.algorithm {
EventEncryptionAlgorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2 => (),
#[cfg(feature = "experimental-algorithms")]
EventEncryptionAlgorithm::MegolmV2AesSha2 => (),
_ => {
warn!(
?room_id,
"Rejecting invalid encryption algorithm {}", new_settings.algorithm
);
return Err(SetRoomSettingsError::InvalidSettings);
}
}
// The new settings are acceptable, so let's save them.
store
.save_changes(Changes {
room_settings: HashMap::from([(room_id.to_owned(), new_settings.clone())]),
..Default::default()
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Returns whether this `OlmMachine` is the same another one.
///
/// Useful for testing purposes only.
#[cfg(any(feature = "testing", test))]
pub fn same_as(&self, other: &OlmMachine) -> bool {
Arc::ptr_eq(&self.inner, &other.inner)
}
/// Testing purposes only.
#[cfg(any(feature = "testing", test))]
pub async fn uploaded_key_count(&self) -> Result<u64, CryptoStoreError> {
let cache = self.inner.store.cache().await?;
let account = cache.account().await?;
Ok(account.uploaded_key_count())
}
/// Returns the identity manager.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn identity_manager(&self) -> &IdentityManager {
&self.inner.identity_manager
}
/// Returns a store key, only useful for testing purposes.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn key_for_has_migrated_verification_latch() -> &'static str {
Self::HAS_MIGRATED_VERIFICATION_LATCH
}
}
fn sender_data_to_verification_state(
sender_data: SenderData,
session_has_been_imported: bool,
) -> (VerificationState, Option<OwnedDeviceId>) {
match sender_data {
SenderData::UnknownDevice { owner_check_failed: false, .. } => {
let device_link_problem = if session_has_been_imported {
DeviceLinkProblem::InsecureSource
} else {
DeviceLinkProblem::MissingDevice
};
(VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::None(device_link_problem)), None)
}
SenderData::UnknownDevice { owner_check_failed: true, .. } => (
VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::None(
DeviceLinkProblem::InsecureSource,
)),
None,
),
SenderData::DeviceInfo { device_keys, .. } => (
VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::UnsignedDevice),
Some(device_keys.device_id),
),
SenderData::VerificationViolation(KnownSenderData { device_id, .. }) => {
(VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::VerificationViolation), device_id)
}
SenderData::SenderUnverified(KnownSenderData { device_id, .. }) => {
(VerificationState::Unverified(VerificationLevel::UnverifiedIdentity), device_id)
}
SenderData::SenderVerified(KnownSenderData { device_id, .. }) => {
(VerificationState::Verified, device_id)
}
}
}
/// A set of requests to be executed when bootstrapping cross-signing using
/// [`OlmMachine::bootstrap_cross_signing`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct CrossSigningBootstrapRequests {
/// An optional request to upload a device key.
///
/// Should be sent first, if present.
///
/// If present, its result must be processed back with
/// `OlmMachine::mark_request_as_sent`.
pub upload_keys_req: Option<OutgoingRequest>,
/// Request to upload the cross-signing keys.
///
/// Should be sent second.
pub upload_signing_keys_req: UploadSigningKeysRequest,
/// Request to upload key signatures, including those for the cross-signing
/// keys, and maybe some for the optional uploaded key too.
///
/// Should be sent last.
pub upload_signatures_req: UploadSignaturesRequest,
}
/// Data contained from a sync response and that needs to be processed by the
/// OlmMachine.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct EncryptionSyncChanges<'a> {
/// The list of to-device events received in the sync.
pub to_device_events: Vec<Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>>,
/// The mapping of changed and left devices, per user, as returned in the
/// sync response.
pub changed_devices: &'a DeviceLists,
/// The number of one time keys, as returned in the sync response.
pub one_time_keys_counts: &'a BTreeMap<OneTimeKeyAlgorithm, UInt>,
/// An optional list of fallback keys.
pub unused_fallback_keys: Option<&'a [OneTimeKeyAlgorithm]>,
/// A next-batch token obtained from a to-device sync query.
pub next_batch_token: Option<String>,
}
/// Convert a [`MegolmError`] into an [`UnableToDecryptInfo`] or a
/// [`CryptoStoreError`].
///
/// Most `MegolmError` codes are converted into a suitable
/// `UnableToDecryptInfo`. The exception is [`MegolmError::Store`], which
/// represents a problem with our datastore rather than with the message itself,
/// and is therefore returned as a `CryptoStoreError`.
fn megolm_error_to_utd_info(
raw_event: &Raw<EncryptedEvent>,
error: MegolmError,
) -> Result<UnableToDecryptInfo, CryptoStoreError> {
use MegolmError::*;
let reason = match error {
EventError(_) => UnableToDecryptReason::MalformedEncryptedEvent,
Decode(_) => UnableToDecryptReason::MalformedEncryptedEvent,
MissingRoomKey(_) => UnableToDecryptReason::MissingMegolmSession,
Decryption(DecryptionError::UnknownMessageIndex(_, _)) => {
UnableToDecryptReason::UnknownMegolmMessageIndex
}
Decryption(_) => UnableToDecryptReason::MegolmDecryptionFailure,
JsonError(_) => UnableToDecryptReason::PayloadDeserializationFailure,
MismatchedIdentityKeys(_) => UnableToDecryptReason::MismatchedIdentityKeys,
SenderIdentityNotTrusted(level) => UnableToDecryptReason::SenderIdentityNotTrusted(level),
// Pass through crypto store errors, which indicate a problem with our
// application, rather than a UTD.
Store(error) => Err(error)?,
};
let session_id = raw_event.deserialize().ok().and_then(|ev| match ev.content.scheme {
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV1AesSha2(s) => Some(s.session_id),
#[cfg(feature = "experimental-algorithms")]
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::MegolmV2AesSha2(s) => Some(s.session_id),
RoomEventEncryptionScheme::Unknown(_) => None,
});
Ok(UnableToDecryptInfo { session_id, reason })
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod test_helpers;
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod tests;